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Abstract. In this paper we show that three potential security vulner-
abilities exist in the strong password-only authenticated key exchange
scheme due to Jablon. Two standardised schemes based on Jablon’s
scheme, namely the first password-based key agreement mechanism in
ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 and the scheme BPKAS-SPEKE in IEEE P1363.2
also suffer from some of these security vulnerabilities. We further show
that other password-based key agreement mechanisms, including those
in ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 and IEEE P1363.2, also suffer from these secu-
rity vulnerabilities. Finally, we propose means to remove these security
vulnerabilities.
1 Introduction
Password-based authenticated key agreement has recently received growing at-
tention. In general, such schemes only require that a human memorable se-
cret password is shared between the participants. In practice, password-based
schemes are suitable for implementation in a wide range of environments, espe-
cially those where no device is capable of securely storing high-entropy long-term
secret keys. Password-based key agreement schemes originate from the pioneering
work of Lomas et al. [8]. Subsequently many password-based key establishment
schemes have been proposed (for example, those in [1–5]). Of course, this is by
no means a complete list of existing protocols.
The password used in such protocols is often generated in one of the following
two ways. Firstly, the password might be randomly selected from a known pass-
word set by a third party. In this case the need for users to be able to memorise
the password will limit the size of the password set. As a result, the password
will possess low entropy. Secondly, a user might be required to select his pass-
word from a known password set. In this case, the user is very likely to choose
the password based on his personal preferences (such as name, birth date) again
in order to memorise the password easily. As a result, even if the password set
is large, the password will still possess low entropy. Moreover, for convenience,
many users select the same passwords with different partners. For example, in
a client-server setting, the client might choose to use the same password with
several different servers.
Because of this low password entropy, despite their implementation conve-
nience, password-based key agreement schemes are potentially prone to password
guessing attacks, including online dictionary attacks and oﬄine dictionary at-
tacks. In the password-based key agreement protocols described in the literature,
much effort has been devoted to prevent such attacks. To restrict online dictio-
nary attacks, the commonly used measure is to set a certain interval between
two consecutive protocol executions, and at the same time to limit the number
of consecutive unsuccessful executions of the protocol. It is clear that an adver-
sary can easily mount a denial of service (DoS) attack against an honest user.
However, means of preventing such attacks are beyond the scope of this paper.
In this paper, we first show that three potential security vulnerabilities exist
in Jablon’s strong password-only authenticated key agreement scheme [2]. The
first password-based key agreement mechanism specified in a draft ISO standard
[6] and the scheme BPKAS-SPEKE given in an IEEE standard draft [7], which
are both based on Jablon’s scheme, also suffer from some of these security vul-
nerabilities. Other password-based key agreement schemes also suffer from these
vulnerabilities. Finally, we show how to remove these vulnerabilities.
2 Description of Jablon’s scheme
In this section, we describe the Jablon scheme. At relevant points we also point
out the differences between the Jablon scheme and the first password-based key
agreement mechanism (in the discrete logarithm setting) in [6], and the scheme
BPKAS-SPEKE (in the discrete logarithm setting) in [7].
In the Jablon protocol, the following parameters are made public. p and q are
two large prime numbers, where p = 2q+1. h is a strong one-way hash function.
Suppose a user (U ) with identity IDU and a server (S ) with identity IDS share
a secret password pw, where pw is assumed to be an integer. When U and S
want to negotiate a session key, they first compute g = pw2 mod p.
Note that in the first mechanism of ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 [6] g is instead
computed as h(pw||str)2, where str is an optional string. Also, in BPKAS-
SPEKE in draft D20 of P1363.2 [7], g is instead computed as h(salt||pw||str)2,
where salt is is a general term for data that supplements a password when input
to a one-way function that generates password verification data. The purpose of
the salt is to make different instances of the function applied to the same input
password produce different outputs. Finally, str is an optional string which it is
recommended should include IDS .
U and S perform the following steps.
1. U generates a random number t1 ∈ Z
∗
q , and sends m1 = g
t1 mod p to S.
2. After receiving m1, S generates a random number t2 ∈ Z
∗
q , and sends m2 =
gt2 mod p to U . S computes z = gt2t1 mod p, and checks whether z ≥ 2.
If the check succeeds, S uses z as the shared key material, and computes
K = h(z) as the shared key.
3. After receiving m2, U computes z = g
t2t1 mod p, and checks z ≥ 2. If the
check succeeds, U uses z as the shared key material, and computes K = h(z)
as the shared key. Then U constructs and sends the confirmation message
C1 = h(h(h(z))) to S.
Note that in both the ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 and IEEE P1363.2 versions of
the mechanism, C1 is instead computed as:
C1 = h(3||m1||m2||g
t1t2 ||g).
4. After receiving C1, S checks that the received message equals h(h(h(z))). If
the check fails, S terminates the protocol execution. Otherwise, S computes
and sends the confirmation message C2 = h(h(z)) to U.
Note that in both the ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 and IEEE P1363.2 versions of
the mechanism, C2 is instead computed as:
C2 = h(4||m1||m2||g
t1t2 ||g),
5. After receiving C2, U checks that it equals h(h(z)). If the check fails, U
terminates the protocol execution. Otherwise, U confirms that the protocol
execution has successfully ended.
Finally, note that in the elliptic curve setting the first password-based key
agreement mechanism in [6] and the scheme BPKAS-SPEKE in [7] are essentially
the same as above, except that g is a generator of the group of points on an
elliptic curve.
3 Security vulnerabilities
In this section we describe three security vulnerabilities in the Jablon protocol,
the third of which is of very general applicability. In addition, we show that the
standardised password-based key agreement mechanisms in [6, 7] also suffer from
certain of these vulnerabilities.
3.1 The first security vulnerability
We show that the Jablon protocol suffers from a partial oﬄine dictionary attack,
which means that an adversary can try several possible passwords by intervening
in only one execution of the protocol.
To mount an attack, the adversary first guesses a possible password pw′ and
replaces the server’s message with m′
2
= (pw′)2t
′
2 in the second step of an ongoing
protocol instance. The adversary then intercepts the authentication message C1
in the third step of the same instance and mounts the attack as follows.
1. The adversary sets i = 1.
2. The adversary computes pw′′ = (pw′)i, and checks whether pw′′ falls into
the password set. If the check succeeds, go to the third step. Otherwise, stop.
3. The adversary checks whether C1 = h(h(h((m1)
it′
2 ))). If the check succeeds,
the adversary confirms that pw = pw′′. Otherwise, set i = i + 1 and go to
the second step.
It is straightforward to verify that this attack is valid. We now give a concrete
example of how the attack works. Suppose that the password set contains all
binary strings of length at most n, where the password pw is made into an
integer by treating the string as the binary representation of an integer. Suppose
that the adversary guesses a password pw′ = 2; then he can try n− 1 passwords
(pw′)i (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) by intervening in only one execution of the protocol.
However, note that the attack only works when the initial guessed password
pw′ satisfies pw′ < 2n/2.
3.2 The second security vulnerability
This security vulnerability exists when one entity shares the same password with
at least two other entities. This is likely to occur when a human user chooses
the passwords it shares with a multiplicity of servers. Specifically we suppose
that a client, say U with identity IDU , shares a password pw with two different
servers, say S1 with identity IDS1 and S2 with identity IDS2 . A malicious third
party can mount the attack as follows.
Suppose U initiates the protocol with an attacker which is impersonating
server S1. Meanwhile the attacker also initiates the protocol with server S2,
impersonating U . The attacker now forwards all messages sent by U (intended
for S1) to S2. Also, all messages sent from S2 to U are forwarded to U as if
they come from S1. At the end of the protocol, U will believe that he/she has
authenticated S1 and has established a secret key with S1. However S1 will not
have exchanged any messages with U . In fact, the secret key will have been
established with S2.
The above attack demonstrates that, even if the server (S1) is absent, the
attacker can make the client believe that the server is present and that they
have computed the same session key as each other. Of course, if U shares the
same password with servers S1 and S2, then S1 can always impersonate U to S2
and also S2 to U , regardless of the protocol design. However, the problem we
have described in the Jablon scheme applies even when U , S1 and S2 all behave
honestly, and this is not a property that is inevitable (we show below possible
ways in which the problem might be avoided).
Based on the descriptions in Section 2, it is straightforward to mount this
attack on the first password-based key agreement mechanism in [6]. In fact, this
attack also applies to the other key agreement mechanisms in [6]. However, if
the identifier of the server is used in computing g, e.g. if it is included in the
string str, then this attack will fail. The scheme BPKAS-SPEKE in [7] is thus
immune to this attack as long as the recommendation given in [7] to include this
identifier in str is followed.
3.3 A generic vulnerability
We next discuss a general problem with key establishment protocols, which not
only applies to the Jablon protocol, but also all those discussed in this paper.
In general this problem may apply if two different applications used by a client-
server pair employ the same protocol and also the same keying material. Suppose
the client and server start two concurrent sessions (A and B say), both of which
need to execute a key establishment protocol.
Suppose also that the protocol instances are running simultaneously, and
that an attacker can manipulate the messages exchanged between the client
and server. The attacker then simply takes all the key establishment messages
sent by the client in session A and inserts them in the corresponding places
in the session B messages sent to the server; at the same time all the session
B key establishment messages are used to replace the corresponding messages
sent to the server in session A. Precisely the same switches are performed on
the messages sent from the server to the client in both sessions. At the end of
the execution of the two instances of the key establishment protocol, the keys
that the client holds for sessions A and B will be the same as the keys held
by the server for sessions B and A respectively. That is, an attacker can make
the key establishment process give false results without it being detected by the
participants.
This problem will arise in any protocol which does not include measures to
securely bind a session identifier to the key established in the protocol. In par-
ticular, the first password-based key agreement mechanisms specified in FCD
11770-4 [6] and the scheme BPKAS-SPEKE in P1363.2 [7] suffer from this vul-
nerability, as will many other two-part key establishment schemes, including
other schemes in these two draft standards.
4 Countermeasures
The following methods can be used to prevent the two security vulnerabilities
discussed above.
1. To prevent the first attack, which only applies to the Jablon protocol, one
possible method is to require g to be computed as g = h(pw||IDU ||IDS ||i) mod
p, where i (i ≥ 0) is the smallest integer that makes g a generator of a mul-
tiplicative subgroup of order q in GF (p)∗.
It is straightforward to verify that the proposed method can successfully
prevent the first attack.
2. One possible method to prevent the second attack is to include the identities
of the participants in the authentication messages C1 and C2. In the Jablon
scheme, C1 and C2 would then be computed as follows:
C1 = h(h(h(z||IDU ||IDS))), C2 = h(h(z||IDS||IDU ))
Correspondingly, in the first password-based key agreement mechanism in
[6], C1 and C2 would then be computed as follows:
C1 = h(3||m1||m2||g
t1t2 ||gt1 ||IDU ||IDS),
and
C2 = h(4||m1||m2||g
t1t2 ||gt1 ||IDS ||IDU ),
3. One possible means of addressing the generic attack described in section 3.3
is to include a unique session identifier in the computation of g in every
protocol instance. For example, in the two standardised mechanisms [6, 7]
the session identifier could be included in str.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that three potential security vulnerabilities exist
in the strong password-only authenticated key exchange scheme due to Jablon
[2] where one of these vulnerabilities is of very general applicability and by
no means specific to the Jablon scheme. We have further shown that the first
password-based key agreement mechanism in ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 and the
scheme BPKAS-SPEKE in IEEE P1363.2 also suffer from certain of these secu-
rity vulnerabilities.
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